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COUN'l'Y OF SAN'rA CLARA, Appellant, v. HAYES
COMP ANY (a Corporation), Respondent.
lla,l bl Counties-Charters-Validity-Mode ot Attacking.-A

. (3J

[41

[5]

[6]

[7]

)

county charter which has been put into effect can only be
attacked in quo warranto proceedings; it cannot be attacked
in action against newspaper publisher for mispublications of
charter prior to election in which voters approved charter.
Limitation of Actions-Suspension of Statute-Prevention
From Taking Action.-Running of statute of limitations is
suspended during any period in which plaintiff is legally prevented from taking action to protect his rights .
Counties-Actions-Limitation of Actions.-Where county was
confronted with choice of assuring damages against newspaper
publisher for mispublications of charter by failing to submit
charter to Legislature for approval or attempting to avoid
any damage by putting charter into effect, it should not, by
very act of attempting to prevent damage from such publisher's wrong, lose benefit of rule tolling statute of limitations
while its action against publisher was barred.
Id.-Actions-Limitation of Actions.-County may not reasonably be held responsible for delay incident to attacking charter
in quo warranto proceedings where such proceedings were
promptly instituted by the People on relation of a third party.
Id.-Actions-Limitation of Actions.-Two-year statute of
limitations (Code Civ. Proc., § 339, subd. 1), if applicable to
county's action against newspaper publisher for damages re··
suIting from mispublications of county charter prior to election in which voters approved charter, was tolled from date
charter went into effect until it was determined to be invalid
by decision of Supreme Court.
Pleading-Theory of Action.-A plaintiff alleging relevant
facts is under no duty to adopt any particular legal theory of
recovery. (CodeCiv. Proc., § 426, subd. 2.)
Counties - Actions - Pleading. - Where damages alleged in
county's action against newspaper for mispublications of proposed county charter might reasonably be anticipated, allegs·

[2] See Cal.Jur., Limitation of Actions. § 160; Am.Jur., Limitation of Actions, § 237 et seq.
[6] See Cal.Jur., Pleading, ~ 35; Am.Jur., Pleading, §§ 81, 82.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Counties, § 4~ [2] Limitation of
Actions, § 109; [3-5] Counties, § 153; [6] Pleading, § 52; [1, 9]
Counties, § 156; [8] Pleading, § 90.
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tions thereof are equally consistent with both contract and
tort recovery. (Civ. Code, §§ 3300, 3333.)
[8] Pleading - Demurrer - Uncertainty. - Where uncertainty of
complaint does not arise out of allegations of relevant facts
but out of legal effect thereof, plaintiff may not be required
to resolve such uncertainty on demurrer and is entitled to seek
any relief consistent with facts alleged.
[9] Oounties-Actions-Pleading.-Whether gravamen of county's
cause of action against newspaper publisher for damages for
mispublications of proposed county charter is in tort or in
contract may be determined, if necessary, when and if pllblisher pleads or seeks to prove facts that might constitute
defense to breach of contract or negligence.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa
Clara Oounty. M. G. Del Mutolo, Judge. Reversed~
Action by county against owner of newspaper for damages
arising out of defective publication of contents of proposed
county charter. Judgment for defendant reversed.
Howard W. Campen, County Counsel (Santa Clara), and
Donald K. Currlin, Assistant County Oounsel, for Appellant .
. Campbell, Custer, Warburton & Britton, Austen D. Warburton and Edwin J. Owens for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J .-Plaintiff has appealed from a judgment
of dismissal entered after it declined to amend its first amended
complaint following the sustaining of a demurrer. In its
first cause of action plaintiff alleged that it orally contracted
with defendant for the latter to publish in its newspaper _...
a proposed county charter for 10 days before the election
of November 2, 1948. Owing to defendant's negligence the
publications of September 17th, 18th, 19th,' 20th and 21st
were so defective.' that the charter was invalidated in qu~
warranto proceedings commenced a few weeks after the charter
went into effect on July 1, 1949. These proceedings were
terminated by a decision of this court on May 28, .1951. On
or about September 27, 1948, defendant filed its affidavit with
plaintiff that the charter had beell published for 10 days.
and plaintiff did not discover that five of the publications
were defective until November 10, 1948, after the charter
had been approved by the voters. In May, 1949, plaintiff
submitted the charter to the Legislature, and it was adopted

Oct. 1954J

COUNTY OF ~ANTA

VLA.lf.A v . .u.a.x= vu.
f43 C.2d 615; 275 P.2d 456]

and approved. PlailltifI seeks to recover the expenses it
incurred in the preparation of the charter and its presentation
to the voters. In its second cause of action plaintiff realleged
the facts stated in its first cause of action and also alleged
that the oral contract had been reduced to writing by defendant on September 30, 1948. A copy of the writing,
consisting of the bill sent by defendant to plaintiff for the
publishing costs, was attached to the complaint. In its third
cause of action plaintiff realleged the facts stated in its
first cau~e of action and also alleged facts purporting to show
that defendant was estopped to plead the statute of limitations. Defendant demurred to each cause of action on the
ground that it was barred by the provisions of subdivision 1
of section 339 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and on th'e
ground that it was uncertain, ambiguous and unintelligible.
Section 339, subdivision 1, provides a two-year statute
of limitations for an action "upon a contract, obligation or
liability not founded upon an instrument in writing . . . . "
Defendant contends that plaintiff's cause of action arose in
September, 1948, when the mispublications occurred, and that
since this action was not filed until November, 1951, it is barred
by the two-year statute. Plaintiff contends, on the other
hand, that the cause of action did not arise until this court
affirmed the judgment invalidating the charter in 1951, and
that in any event, either section 337, subdivision 1, or
section 343 of the Code of Civil Procedure is the applicable
section. It also contends that if the cause of action accrued
at the time of the mispublications, the statute was tolled from
July 1, 1949, to May 28, 1951, the period the charter was
in effect.
It is unnecessary to decide whether plaintiff's cause of
action accrued when defendant failed properly to publish the
charter, when plaintiff learned of the mispublications, or when
the mispublications resulted in damage. Even if it is assumed
that plaintiff's cause of action accrued at the earliest of these
dates, the action was timely brought.
In the light of the decision invalidating the charter (People
v. Oounty of Santa Clara, 37 Ca1.2d 335 [231 P.2d 826]),
it is clear that plaintiff would have been justified in not
presenting the charter to the Legislature for approval at
the 19~9 session. Had it followed that course nothing would
have prevented it from immediately bringing an action against
defendant for damages. Instead, however, plaintiff took the
position that the mispublications were not sufficient to in-
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vaJida1-,p the proceedings, and it succ('ssfully prevellted the
superior court. from enjoining t.he certification of the charter
to the Legislature. (Santa Clara Co'unty v. Snperior Court,
33 Ca1.2d 552 [203 P.2d 1].) Thereafter the charter was
approved by the Legislature, and it went into effect on July I,
1949. [ia] Once the charter had been put into effect, however, it could only be attacked in quo warranto proceedIngs_
(Taylor v. Cole, 201 CaL 327,333,338-340 [257 P. 40]. and
cases cited; see Amencan D·istl. Co. v. City Council of Sausa·
lito, 34 Ca1.2d 660, 667 L213 P.2d 704, 18 A.L.R.2d 1247].)
Under these circumstances the principle stated in Dillon v.
Board of Pens'tOn Commrs., 18 Ca1.2d 427 [116 P.2d 37. 136
A.L.R.800], is applicable. [2] "It is well recognized that
the running of the statute of limitations is suspended during
any period in which the plaintiff is legally prevented from
taking action to protect his rights." (18 Ca1.2d at 431: see
also Berger v. O'Hearn, 41 Ca1.2d 729, 733 [264 P.2d 10];
Estate of CaravQ,s, 40 Ca1.2d 33, 40 [250 P.2d 593] ; Judson v.
Super'tor Court, 21 Ca1.2d 11, 14 [129 P.2d 3611 : Christ~n v.
Superior Court, 9 Ca1.2d 526, 532-533 [71 P.2d 205, 112
A.L.R. 1153]; Kinard v. Jordan, 175 Cal. 13, 15 [164 P.
894] ; Marden v. Ba·ilard, 124 Cal.App.2d 458, 465 [268 P.2d
809]; Marti'n v. Goggin, 107 Cal.App.2d 688, 690 r238
P.2d 84] ; Burns v. Massachusetts etc. Ins. Co., 62 Cal.App.2d
962, 970 [146 P.2d 24]; Wells v. California Tomato Juice,
Inc., 47 Cal.App.2d 634, 638 [118 P.2d 916]; Archer v.
Edwards, 19 Cal.App.2d 253, 256 [65 P.2d 115]; Estate 01
Morrison, 125 Cal.App. 504, 510 [14 P.2d 102]; Elliott &Horne v.Chambers Land Co., 61 Cal.App. 310, 312 [215 P.
99] ; Code Civ. Proc., § 356.) [ib] While the charter was
in effect, plaintiff could not attack it in an actIon against
defendant and thus could not establish damages flowing from
the mispublications.
It is contended, however, that since plaintiff could have
avoided the bar of the rule against collateral attack of its
charter by not submitting the charter to the Legislature for
approval, it should not be allowed to rely on that bar now.
[3] Plaintiff was not in a position, however, indefinitely to
delay proceedings. (See Dillon v. Board of Pension Commrs.,
31lpra, 18 Ca1.2d 427, 430.) As was pointed out in Santa
Clara County v. Superior Court, supra, 33 Ca1.2d 552, 554,
plaintiff was required to submit the charter to the then current
session of the Legislature, if it was to become effective at all.
It was confronted with the choice of assuring damages by
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failing to submit the charter or attempting to avoid any
damage by putting it into effect. It would be anomalous if
by the very act of attempting to prevent damage from defendant's wrong, it should lose the benefit of the rule tolling
the statute while its action was barred. (See Christin v.
Superior Court, supra, 9 Ca1.2d 526, 532-533; Burns v. Massachusetts etc. Ins. Co., S'ltpra, 62 Cal.App.2d 962, 969-971.)
[4] Moreover, plaintiff may not reasonably be held responsible for the delay incident to attacking the charter in quo
warranto proceedings. Even if it is assumed that plaintiff
could or should otherwise have instituted proceedings to
test the validity of its charter, it was unnecessary for it to
do so when, as in this case, quo warranto proceedings were
. promptly instituted by the People on the relation of a third
party. [5] We conclude, therefore, that the statute of
limitations was tolled from the date the charter went into
effect until the date it was finally determined to be invalid
by the decision of this court. Accordingly, the action is
not barred by the provisions of section 339', subdivision (1),
of the Code of Civil Procedure. (See Estate of Carava.~.
Sll,pra, 40 Ca1.2d 33, 42; Berger v. O'Hearn, supra, 41 Ca1.2d
729, 733; Burns v. Massachu.setts etc. Ins. 00., supra, 62 Cal.
App.2d 962, 970.)
[6] Defendant contends that the demurrer was properly
sustained for uncertainty, unintelligibility, and ambiguity on
the ground that it cannot be determined whether plaintiff's
action is in contract or in tort. In its first cause of action
plaintiff alleged the relevant facts, and it was under no duty
to adopt any particular legal theory of recovery. (Code Ci v.
Proc., § 426, subd. (2) ; Cal'l:fornia W. S. L. Ins. 00. v. Tucker.
15 Ca1.2d 69, 71 [98 P.2d 511] ; Oampbell v. Veith, 121 Cnl.
App.2d 729, 731 [264 P.2d 141].) It is clear, however, that
it stated a cause of action for the breach of an oral contraot.
No purpose would be served by now determining whether
the additional fact that the breach was negligent may permit
plaintiff to pursue tort as well as contract remedies. (Sen
Eads v. Marks, 39 Cal.2d 807, 810-812 [249 P.2d 2571.)
[7] The action was brought within the shortest applicable
period of limitations as extended, and since the damages
alleged might reasonably be anticipated, the allegations ther('ot
are equally consistent with both contract and tort recovery.
(Civ. Code, § § 3300, 3333.) [8] The uncertainty, if any.
does not arise out of the allegations of the relevant fa<lts,
but out of the legal effect thereof. Plaintiff may not be
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required to resolve such uncertainty on demurrer, however
(see Bacon v. Wahrhaftig, 97 Cal.App.2d 599, 605 [218 P.2d
144]; Juri v. Koster, 84 Cal.App. 298, 302 [257 P. 901j),
and it is entitled to seek any relief consistent with the fact~
alleged. (Buxbom v. Sm.ith, 23 Ca1.2d 535, 542 [145 P.2d
305] ; Keidatz v. Albany, 39 Ca1.2d 826, 829 [249 P.2d 264].)
[9] Whether the gravamen of its cause of action is in tort
or in contract may be determined if necessary,when and if
defendant pleads or seeks to prove facts that might constitute
a defense to breach of contract on the one hand or negligence
on the other.
Since plaintiff's first cause of action is good against the
general and special demurrer, and since its second and third
causes of action allege the same facts, the trial court also erred
in sustaining the demurrer as to them whether or not the
additional facts alleged therein are uncertain or immaterial.
(Stafford v. Shu'uz, 42 Ca1.2d 767, 782 [270 P.2d 1] ; Bacon v.
Wahrhaftig, supra, 97 Cal.App.2d 599, 605; Merlino v. West
Coast Macaroni Mfg. Co., 90 Cal.App.2d 106, 108 [202 P.2d
748] ; Aronson v. Bank of America Nat. T. &- 8. Assn., 42
Cal.App.2d 710, 720-721 [109 P.2d 1001].)
The judgment is reversed.

)

Gibson, C. J 0, Shenk, J., and Carter, J., concurred.
Schauer, J .. concurred in the judgment.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied November
24, 1954.

